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Abstract. Drawing upon Karl Giberson and Mariano Artigas’ joint book The Oracles of 
Science, I discuss the limits of an emphasis on so-called philosophical bridges in the 
relationship between science and religion. Epistemological and metaphysical anal-
yses of the claims by scientists and religious people are indeed necessary to avoid 
illegitimate extrapolations; but a clear separation between scientific and religious 
statements is problematic. Following Ludwig Fleck’s characterisation of the esoteric 
and the exoteric circles of science, I argue that popularization of science is always 
embedded in scientific cultures and ideological agendas and that one cannot expect 
a clear demarcation criterion between pure science and pure popularization. I also 
consider Lyda Walsh’s rhetorical analysis of the scientists as prophets to understand 
the oracles’ public portrayal of science in pseudo-religious terms.
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In their joint volume Oracles of Science. Celebrity Scientists versus God and 
Religion, Mariano Artigas and Karl Giberson (2007) dealt with the public 
role of some star scientists as icons in the science-and-religion industry. 
The six authors they chose were well-respected scientists who, so the 
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authors claimed, abused their prestige as public figures in physics and in 
biology to make unwarranted extrapolations in the realms of philosophy, 
ontology and theology.1 The Oracles is a nicely written book, accessible to 
a wide audience, with a clear thesis: many supposed controversies between 
science and religion come from illegitimate inferences and lack of solid 
philosophical analyses by a few, but very popular scientists.
Indeed, this is one of the main arguments in the thought of Artigas, 
one that is deeply rooted in the tradition of Thomism, loosely understood. 
From his point of view, conflicts between modern science and the Catholic 
faith (or, at times, with religion at large) dissolve when proper philosophical 
and metaphysical examination of the scope, presuppositions and methods 
of the sciences take place. The so-called dialogue between science and 
religion is either mediated by the bridge of a realist philosophy or it becomes 
a dialogue of the deaf, so he argued. Of course, the problem here lies in 
what he considered to be a valid philosophy for analysis: one that accepts 
that both science and faith are in the business of truth and that there is 
no such thing as ‘double truth’, which distanced him from the extremes of 
both scientism and religious fundamentalism.
However commendable the Oracles is, my interest in this paper is not 
so much on what it says, but on what it does not say. Specifically, I want 
to argue that beyond the stance on the intrinsic epistemic limitations and 
scope of science, religion and theology, as well as the potential philosophical 
bridges or chasms between them, this book hints at a topic that Artigas 
seldom addressed, and then only in the last years of his career; namely, 
that the science-and-religion disputes are public disputes that transcend 
the close limits of what he thought to be legitimate science and legitimate 
religion. Indeed, when Giberson and Artigas (2007, 4) complain that the 
oracles “have impeccable scientific pedigrees, but it is their unusual gift for 
communication that has given them a platform for speaking to millions out-
side the academic community, rather than the tiny audiences of specialists 
to whom their colleagues speak,” they implicitly establish a neat distinction 
1 The celebrity scientists in the book were Richard Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould, Stephen 
Hawking, Carl Sagan, Steven Weinberg and Edward O. Wilson.
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between science and non-science, following the demarcationist tradition of 
neo-positivism. Distinguishing between ‘provinces of knowledge’, disciplines, 
methods and illegitimate inferences is one of the main tasks of the philos-
opher, and indeed a much-needed one; but historians and sociologists of 
science have shown that attempts to clarify the boundaries between science 
and religion, science and politics, science and power, or even the classical 
dichotomy between science and technology, are bound to failure. Therefore, 
a surgical distinction between what the oracles legitimately say and do in 
their areas of expertise and what they do in the public sphere is only one 
way, necessary but limited, to censure the abuses of celebrity scientists.
In this paper I want to draw attention to alternative ways in which one 
can understand and decry the excesses of celebrity scientists, drawing from 
the tradition of what is vaguely known as Science Studies. Specifically, 
I would like to challenge the notion that one can naturalise the demarcation 
between science (or the sciences) and religion(s), faith(s) or theology(ies). 
An essentialist view of any of these notions can be problematic and so are, 
thus, the boundaries between them, both historically and sociologically. In 
the first section I shall point at some aspects of the history of the evolution 
of what ‘true’ science was, or was perceived to be, both in Christian and sec-
ular contexts. With this, the demarcation between science and religion will 
prove to be complex enough so as to help us understand one of the reasons 
why the phenomenon of the oracles is not so strange as one might think.
In section two I shall delve into the question of science popularization. 
The oracles act as popularisers, and very ideologically biased ones for that 
matter. However, the received view of a strict separation between true science 
and popular science on which Artigas and Giberson base their argument is 
historically and sociologically problematic. The boundaries between esoteric 
and exoteric circles of science are blurred, and thus one cannot criticise the 
oracles only because they offer a highly prejudiced view of science. Rather, 
I want to argue that it is precisely in the fact that they present themselves 
as ‘priests of Nature’ where one can find another Achilles heel of theirs. 
In other words, one might want to accept that the oracles have opinions 
and present them in the name of science, whatever that means; but not 
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that they put them forward as the only valid interpretation of science. As 
we shall see, their dogmatic approach goes against the democratic turn in 
science that has taken place among many Science Studies scholars.
Finally, in the third section I recall the prophetic ethos of science in 
all times. Why is it that the New Atheism uses science as one of their main 
allies? I shall argue that oracular rhetorical strategies are not so alien to 
science as one might think. Promises, predictions and confidence are part 
and parcel of the way modern science has developed and is still developing. 
Just think, for instance, in the increasingly large sections devoted to outcome, 
social impact and outreach in any grant application nowadays. As we shall 
see, institutional science is oracular, and not only its popular side.
1. On ‘true’ science and the boundaries  
between science and religion
In 1901, the Spanish Jesuit province started a new generalist periodical, 
Razón y Fe (Reason and Faith), designed to give the Catholic, educated 
audiences arguments to defend their faith and to take part in the increasingly 
secularised debates in the public sphere (Sanz de Diego 1998). The fist issue 
contains a programmatic editorial with a rather belligerent tone, common 
at the time, against the misuse of writing: “In other times the arts and 
literature turned the fierce soldier into a discrete gentleman; nowadays, 
they turn the kind gentleman into an enraged revolutionary. Then science 
helped to teach the ignorant, now it misleads the intelligent” (Razón y Fe 
1901, 1, 1). The editorial went on saying that one of the main goals of the 
periodical was to combat the “clamouring from false science, delusive 
philosophy and corrupting literature” against the Catholic faith, and even 
against natural truths (2–3).
Although the journal was meant to have a broad coverage, with theo-
logical, social, legal and ethical topics, the first article after the editorial 
in the first issue was devoted to “Free Science and Revelation”. The essay 
started praising the “vast intellectual work amassed by the scientific activity 
of the last one-hundred years” only to continue with a complaint about the 
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misuse of scientific productions to combat Revelation, and a defence that 
“good science” should include God and Revelation. After criticising the 
Enlightenment’s “philosophism” and 19th-century “rationalism”, the article 
complained that “the elimination of God from the field of human science 
is the fundamental axiom of modern philosophy, separating itself radically 
from the Christian and Scholastic duality” (Murillo 1901, 8–9).
The author of this article, the Jesuit scholar in Scripture Lino Murillo 
(1901, 22), claimed that the “main consequence of the irreligious movements 
in Spain has been to form, not men of science, but practical sceptics, […] 
and political revolutionaries”. This attitude is significant in the context of 
Spanish early-twentieth-century regenerationism. Implicit in this statement 
we perceive the underlying war between tradition and revolution in which 
“science” was a weapon used on both sides of the fence. If liberals, social-
ists and anti-clericals were blaming the Church for the Spanish scientific 
and technological backwardness, many Catholic intellectuals thought of 
themselves as science-promoters. The battle was not between pro- and 
anti-science but about what science was and who was doing the most for 
it. In other words, the battle was not strictly scientific but rhetorical, since 
the very nature, scope and methods of science were under scrutiny and all 
sides wanted to present themselves as “scientific”.
Some decades earlier, in Britain, Christian theology had been the 
instrument used to educate the general public into the principles and 
developments of the emerging modern sciences. The Bridgewater Treatises 
on the Power, Wisdom and Goodness of God as Manifested in the Creation 
(1833–1836), written by well-respected men of science and members of 
the Anglican and Scottish churches, are often recalled as one of the major 
episodes in the specifically British brand of natural theology. In his study of 
their reception and usage, however, Jonathan Topham (1992, 398) explained 
the success of the Treatises on the grounds that “they presented the pious 
middle classes with a largely non-technical and religiously conservative 
compendium of contemporary science”, and that they became an “important 
part of the pedagogic apparatus of those engaged in popular education” due 
to the lack of alternative books. As a matter of fact, from a theological point 
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of view, the Treatises were hardly innovative; it was their science, presented 
in a religiously acceptable context, which enhanced their popularity among 
educators. In other words, the Treatises did not proof religious truths with 
the help of science but the other way around: religion granted legitimacy 
to the emerging sciences.
The taken-for-granted religious foundations of science, as well as the 
support to established religion from science, were soon challenged by, among 
others, the group of men known as the X-Club, led by Thomas H. Huxley. This 
dining club was formally established as a group of men united in their “devotion 
to science, pure and free, untrammelled by religious dogmas” (quoted in Barton 
1998, 411). In his recent book, Huxley’s Church and Maxwell’s Demon, Matthew 
Stanley (2015) describes the social and political background that shaped 
Huxley’s contempt for the role of Anglicanism in British scientific institutions. 
Coming from a middle class background, he struggled to find a paid job in 
science and he always felt rejected in the English academic establishment. 
In Stanley’s words, “Huxley and his friends’ difficulties in finding work became 
one of their defining characteristics. Even further, their decision about who 
was responsible for their difficulties helped shape their identities for the rest of 
their lives: the Church of England” (Stanley (2015 24). This point is important 
because much of the belligerent rhetoric of Huxley and others was not aimed 
against religion per se but against the monopoly of the traditional academic 
elite, which happened to be mainly members of the Church of England. Rather 
than anti-religious, their attacks were largely anti-clerical.
This professional dimension of the science-religion disputes in Victorian 
Britain, famously described first by the late Frank Turner (1974, 1978), is 
worth remembering. The configuration of modern science as we know it 
today is now commonly regarded as a process happening throughout the 
nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, a process that is not only 
intellectual or philosophical but also institutional, cultural and professional 
(Cunningham and Williams, 1993). The two examples from Spain and Britain 
show that there was no agreed essentialist view of what science was or had to 
be, nor who were the natural practitioners of science. And as Peter Harrison 
(2006, 2015) has argued, the boundaries between science and religion only 
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emerged as a consequence of this contingent process of transforming the 
notions and practices in both science and religion.
The same applies to the many trials in the US on whether Darwinism, 
creationism or Intelligent Design can or should be taught in State schools. To 
think that those disputes are mainly about the content of science is to miss 
the point. The debate was and is one of legitimacies in the public sphere, 
State control over education and the private lives of the citizens, the role of 
tradition and morality in public life and many other such issues. Moreover, as 
Giberson and Artigas point out, one outcome of the antireligious campaigns 
of the New Atheism is a visceral reaction against science: “the Oracles do 
indeed make a great many negative comments about religion and belief 
in God”. For instance, “ID polemicists gather these comments and fashion 
them into a compelling argument that science is hostile to religion. Since 
most Americans are more loyal to their faith than to science, this argument 
works effectively to turn them away from science and make them open to 
ID” (Giberson and Artigas 2007, 15).
Huxley and his fellow X-Club members disregarded the Anglican Church 
because they saw it as the enemy in their attempts to professionalize science 
and to gain access to the traditional academic institutions. ID supporters 
disregard contemporary science because they fear the attacks on their 
religious beliefs and practices by the excesses of naturalism. Neo-Thomists 
in the early twentieth century despised some modern science because it was 
not “true” science and it was used as a rhetorical weapon in the secularizing 
process of political structures. In all cases one of the main elements under 
scrutiny was the very nature of what science had to be, and who was legit-
imized to speak for it. From this point of view, thus, the oracles of science 
are only adding to this long tradition of battles for the appropriation and 
supremacy in this thing we call science.
2. Popularization and the esoteric circles of science
The Oracles of Science deals with the contentious topic of what is normally 
known as popularization or vulgarization of science. The traditional diffusion 
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model states that the experts in any field are the ones in charge of making 
specialised knowledge available to the general, largely ignorant public. This 
paternalistic, top-down view on how to educate the masses has been highly 
criticised, and not just as a naïve reaction against all forms of authoritari-
anism. The diffusion model assumes that knowledge is produced in certain 
very esoteric circles that, like ivory towers isolated from the world, manage 
to remain unpolluted from external interferences that would contaminate 
the purity of science. Only after such pure knowledge is produced would 
the experts be allowed to transmit it to the general public in a digested way. 
Thus, we fall again in an essentialist view of science that allows for clear 
demarcations: the ivory tower would have well-defined methodological 
and institutional boundaries so as to police, like a Maxwell’s demon, who 
should be part of the scientific elite.
The question often arises as to who appointed Dawkins, Hawking and other 
oracles as spokespersons for science, let alone religion, and why their views 
on science would be more legitimate than anyone else’s. Because, as Giberson 
and Artigas (2007, 9) argued, “the scientific community, through the lenses 
of its six leading spokespersons, is hostile to religion, atheistic, and primarily 
engaged in the investigation of origins. None of these characterizations are 
true. Science is not hostile to religion, scientists are not consistently atheistic, 
and origins are not the primary focus of scientific investigation”. The crux of 
the matter is that “science” is not a something. Science is neither one institu-
tion nor one set of doctrines or one specific behaviour. Science is, above all 
a human activity and, thus, a contingent and changing one. “The scientific 
community is a gigantic worldwide network of scholars trained in a broad cross 
section of disciplines, supported by a variety of funding entities, and assisted 
by a vast technical and publishing infrastructure” (7). That is why no single 
interpretation of this thing we call science can be regarded as uniquely valid.
“And therein lies the problem”, argue Giberson and Artigas. “When 
a small handful of leaders step forward to speak for the whole, there arises 
the possibility that their portrayals of science may be skewed or even dis-
torted and science might be misunderstood” (7). Unique, almost dogmatic 
interpretations of science and its contents, which is what the oracles often 
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do, clashes with many contemporary views on how science actually works. 
The problem is not only their all-encompassing scientism, but also that 
their scientism is based on a very particular, exclusive and highly problem-
atic notion of science: one in which the general public is only the passive 
recipient of knowledge.
In his Science in the Public Sphere, historian of science Agustí Nieto-Galan 
(2011/2016) illustrates the many ways in which numerous publics become 
part and parcel of the scientific activity. Experts and lay people do certainly 
exist, but such categorisation is rather fluid and, thus, often problematic. Let 
us imagine for instance a Nobel Prize winner for her work in one branch of 
physics. Would that make her an authority in organic chemistry or evolutionary 
biology? Not really. Possibly a blind peer-review article of hers in The Lancet 
on how to treat diabetes would immediately be rejected. She is not an expert. 
But that does not mean her work can never be influential among medical 
doctors. Her public lectures, her methodological approaches, technological 
spin-offs from her discoveries or simply a donation from her prize to a research 
hospital may shape some further scientific development in areas other than 
her very specific field of expertise. But that is not true only in the case of very 
influential Nobel Prize recipients: every individual is actually present in one 
or more of the concentric circles around the most esoteric cores of science.
Many decades ago, Ludwig Fleck (1935/1979) suggested that a scien-
tific fact was the outcome of a thought collective and thought styles. The 
former he defined as a “community of persons mutually exchanging ideas 
or maintaining intellectual interaction” (1979, 39) and the latter as “the 
readiness for directed perception, with corresponding mental and objective 
assimilation of what has been so perceived” (99). Contrary to Thomas Kuhn’s 
later notion of “scientific community”, one characteristic of which was the 
strict separation between those converted to one paradigm and those loyal 
to another, incommensurable one, Fleck’s thought collective has a more fluid 
structure, consisting “of both a small esoteric circle and a larger exoteric 
circle, each consisting of members belonging to the thought collective and 
forming around any work of the mind, such as a dogma of faith, a scientific 
idea, or an artistic musing”. Moreover, a thought collective “consists of many 
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such intersecting circles. Any individual may belong to several exoteric 
circles but probably only to a few, if any, esoteric circles” (105).
From this point of view both science and its popularization are activities 
more democratic than any form of positivism would ever imagine. Certainly, 
democratic does not mean here that scientific truth is totally relative and 
the random product of a process of elections and polls. But at least since 
the famous farewell address of President Eisenhower in 1961 pointing at 
the dangers of leaving science and technology in the inscrutable hands 
of the industrial-military complex that had emerged after the two world 
wars, democratic societies have expected more accountability from science 
and technology. Pharmaceutical scandals, environmental disasters, or the 
many battles about the extent and causes of global warming are only a few 
episodes through which the general public has felt the urge not to leave 
“scientific” decisions only to “the scientists”. Even the blind peer review 
system, which is still one of the major watchdogs to preserve Merton’s virtues 
in the scientific community, has proven to be flawed in several occasions. 
The ivory tower of science cannot be totally isolated.
The participatory turn in science should not be lightly identified with 
extreme social constructivism. The positive side of the so-called science wars 
of the 1990s, with denunciations such as Levitt and Gross’ (1994) Higher 
Superstition or the famous (or infamous, depending on the constituency) 
Sokal affair (Sokal and Bricmont, 1997), is that it helped clarify many 
issues. If the Strong Program in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge was 
challenged, so was the perception of the scientist as the undisputed priest 
of nature. And here the status of the oracles comes to the fore.
When science is made socially accountable, the chances for the oracles 
to have their own way largely diminish. While they are entitled to act as 
popularisers or even to make logically or metaphysically erroneous extrap-
olations, their authority as spokespersons for science is challenged. In other 
words, the participatory turn in science is not mainly a way to democratise 
the most esoteric circles of science but, moreover, the exoteric ones. Thus, 
attempts by the oracles to act in the name of science may be immediately 
undermined not only because they are true or false, legitimate or illegitimate, 
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but because they are top-down, dogmatic interpretations of the nature and 
content of their views on science.
Ironically, that was the major criticism of Sokal and Bricmont to what 
they regarded as the Intellectual Impostures of the Humanities and the Social 
Sciences. Their success in publishing the hoax article “Transgressing the 
Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” 
(Sokal, 1996) wanted to prove the contrast between serious, peer-reviewed, 
methodological sound sciences with postmodern gibberish. Fair enough. 
What they did not seem to include in their criticism was the dialectical 
excesses of the self-appointed missionaries of atheism in the name of 
science. Not surprisingly, even Richard Dawkins—the contemporary oracle 
par excellence—supported Sokal’s experiment. In his review of Intellectual 
Impostures for Nature, the great apostle of science accused the world of 
cultural studies and science studies of being full of “half-truths, falsehoods 
and non sequiturs”, written by “tenured professors at some of the best 
universities […] wielding power over young academics who might secretly 
aspire to an honest academic career in literary studies or, say, anthropology” 
(Dawkins 1998, 143). If only we remember that Dawkins has used his Oxford 
chair in Popular Understanding of Science as a springboard for his crusade 
one wonders if he cannot see the beam in his own eye.
3. Oracles, prophets and science
If democratic and participatory understandings of science challenge the 
priestly status of the expert in the very construction of science, let alone its 
interpretations, why is it oracles still exist, and not without popular success? 
Perhaps we should not blame them and their arguments only. “Like the 
traditional oracles of classical Greece, Shakespeare, and even the hit movies 
about the Matrix, they tell us what we need to know. Are we alone in the 
universe? Where did we come from? Did the universe have a beginning? 
Is there a point to our existence? Are we the products of random chance?” 
(Giberson and Artigas, 2007, 5). Pace Max Weber, the modern world does 
not seem to be as disenchanted as some might think.
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In an article initially intended for the Oracles, but published years 
later, Giberson (2011) stated that “in subtle and implicit ways, though, the 
arch-critics of religion are realizing that humans need more from science 
than factual accounts of how we got here and accurate descriptions of the 
world we inhabit”. Scientific accounts “provide no larger context for our 
lives, no guidance for how we should live, no insights into right and wrong, 
no recipes for the building of community. They do not, on their own, have 
anything to say about purpose. So, while they may be exciting on one level, 
they fall short of serving as replacement religions” (Giberson 2011, 206). 
The quasi-religious statements of the oracles in their popular books try to 
fill this gap. ‘Science is all there is’, so the mantra of the oracle goes; and ‘if 
factual science is not enough, let us introduce ethical, religious and mystical 
notions wrapped under the guise of science’. In this way the first premise, 
‘science is all there is’, remains intact.
That the oracles are trying to re-enchant the world through science 
is rather obvious. More surprising may be the fact that they try to do so 
while holding a positivistic and authoritarian view of science. Who grants 
the scientists, or perhaps better, “science”, such authority over society? 
Lynda Walsh has an answer to this question worth noting. In her Scientists 
as Prophets. A Rhetorical Genealogy, Walsh (2013) argues that the rhetorical 
structure of modern science, now as well as in the times of Francis Bacon, 
is in continuation with the place of oracles in Ancient Greece or prophets 
in the Old Testament. In all cases, she argues, we find the same “prophetic 
ethos”: “a role that a polity—a group of people who must work together to 
stay together—authorizes to manufacture certainty for them”. The role of 
that prophetic ethos would be to grant “political certainty” in times of crisis: 
“When a polity encounters a crisis in which right action cannot be ascer-
tained via traditional democratic debate, it turns to its prophets. But while 
it expects certain knowledge from those prophets, what it gets from them 
instead is a dialogue that can lead to political certainty” (Walsh 2013, 2).
The prophetic ethos that Walsh describes “can be performed by anyone 
who can (a) demonstrate privileged access to knowledge beyond the public 
ken and (b) use that demonstration to engage the polity in a dialogue about 
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its covenant values” (3). The examples she uses include the Royal Society as 
a place for discussion and for safely disputing received social values, J. Robert 
Oppenheimer’s affair as a challenge to the values of the Cold War in America, 
Rachel Carson’s role as the prophetess of Nature with her Silent Spring, or 
contemporary debates on global warming. In all these cases, Walsh finds 
that science plays not so much a role of providing with unquestionable data 
and certainty, but the locus for discussions on our lives and our collective 
values. From this point of view, and going back to Giberson and Artigas, 
the oracles only use their prestige as scientists, as bearers of some esoteric 
knowledge (point a of Walsh’s characterisation), to engage the public into 
debates on the role of religion in the public sphere (point b).
Walsh uses the Oracles of Science in one of her chapters. One reason for 
the success of modern oracles, she claims, is that “three additional features 
of mass media synergize with the prophetic ethos of science advisors”; 
namely, “the tendency to frame science in terms of controversy; heavy trade 
in visual and verbal metaphor; and, the uncontrollability of mass media 
messages” (140). The first, controversy, has always been part and parcel of 
science, not only in modern media. As Shapin and Schaffer (1985) famously 
showed, scientific controversies do not happen in an ideological vacuum but 
in politically and philosophically biased environments. The context of the 
English Civil War was not just a stage but the locus that enabled and shaped 
Hobbes and Boyle’s differing interpretations of the air pump. Similarly, the 
political context of the so-called Bible belt in America, for instance, is not 
just a contingent stage for debates on Creationism or Intelligent Design, but 
the only place where such controversies can happen. Thus, when trying to 
make sense of the success of some oracles, one should be aware not only of 
the reasoning at stake but the social context in which those disputes take 
place. Without the controversy to which they address, the naked arguments 
appear only too naïve.
Metaphors are also an intrinsic part of science, and not just a rhetorical 
device for educating the masses. Pace most logical positivisms, numbers 
are not the only language of science. Even these need to be presented in 
the form of graphs, charts and diagrams. Soul-less depictions of supposedly 
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neutral facts in what Daston and Galison (2007) call “mechanical objectivity” 
are not the only kind of representations we find in science. From botany 
to nanotechnology, communication between specialists is more often than 
not mediated by idealised images, metaphors and analogies. Moreover, 
such metaphors and representations often constitute the starting point for 
scientific reasoning, not their terminus for educational purposes only. And 
here we reach a loophole: the same metaphors that helped guide the initial 
stages of a research may re-appear explicitly after a theory is developed 
and needs to be explained. In Walsh’s words (2013, 148): “When these 
theory-constitutive metaphors are in turn employed as “exegetical” meta-
phors to explain science to the public, we get a sort of epistemological and 
rhetorical “black hole”: the divinatory metaphors used to answer questions 
about the natural world become the very way we experience those insensible 
aspects of the natural world”. Thus, the oracles cannot be blamed for using 
metaphors in their representation of nature; only, perhaps, for not making 
the public explicitly aware of this resource.
Finally, the uncontrollability of media messages accounts for the success 
of the oracles. In Delphos, the pythia would never say something totally 
alien to the expectations of the city. Her messages were vague enough so 
as to generate consensus, and in order to incite assent they would never 
frontally challenge the status quo of the contestants. In the case of modern 
oracles, this is a “good reminder that prophet’s messages must confirm 
underlying currents in public discourse to be heard, and that a prophet 
cannot unilaterally determine the outcome of a dialogue that he begins 
with the polity” (Walsh 2013, 151). In other words, the success of the oracles 
of science in their attacks to most forms of religion can only be explained 
not on the grounds of their arguments but because they authoritatively say 
what a part of the public opinion already want to hear.
The oracles “are the ‘public intellectuals’ of this generation, perennially 
present in media outlets […] They are the leaders of the Third Culture, 
doing exactly what C.P. Snow lamented was not getting done” (Giberson 
and Artigas 2007, 7). But, ironically, the result is not what Snow expected 
would happen. With their abuse of prophetic rhetoric, rather than bridging 
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the gap between the Sciences and the Humanities, they reinforce those 
boundaries; the oracles present their science, not as common sense but as 
special knowledge granted only to them, thus “reinforcing the extraordinary 
calling of scientists-prophets” (Walsh 2013, 154).
Conclusion
In 1870, the First Vatican Council of the Catholic Church proclaimed that 
“although faith is above reason, nevertheless, between faith and reason no 
true dissension can ever exist […] A vain appearance of such a contradiction 
arises chiefly from this, that either the dogmas of faith have not been un-
derstood and interpreted according to the mind of the Church, or deceitful 
opinions are considered as the determinations of reason” (Pius IX 1870). This 
dogmatic declaration has shaped much of the science-and-religion debates 
in Catholic milieus. The emphasis on the compatibility between human 
reason and (Catholic) faith, both as legitimate and congruent instruments 
to access reality, has put truth at the centre of science-and-religion debates. 
This is possibly the most important task of the philosopher in addressing 
these issues, and Artigas and Giberson pay tribute to this tradition in their 
Oracles of Science.
In this paper I have attempted to broaden the picture and to point at 
complementary dimensions that may help understand the public disputes 
triggered by the so-called New Atheists. By showing the historical and social 
loci in which these arguments take place, philosophers and apologists will 
have more instruments in their task. Otherwise they may find themselves 
repeating the same arguments over and over again not knowing why they 
fail to convince. Moreover, by not acknowledging the broader picture they 
may end up promoting their opponents’ agendas. One instance in which 
this might happen, and indeed does happen, is by trying to create a clear 
demarcation between science and non-science, and to criticize the oracles 
for stepping outside their zone. This may consolidate the positivistic view 
on science and the attempts to establish a criterion of demarcation or, worse, 
a criterion of meaning. Another example would come from the philosophers’ 
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attempts to universalize the conflicts (and their solutions) between science 
and religion. Extending arguments against non-existing problems may easily 
backfire, by highlighting decontextualised disputes where they did not exist. 
Attention to the locality of the oracles’ arguments is thus an essential point 
to stress in the philosophical analysis of potential conflicts.
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